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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.   
 Kevin Harris and Anthony Jackson seek discretionary 
reductions of their sentences pursuant to § 404 of the First Step 
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.  The 
District Courts denied relief, and on appeal, the primary issue 
is § 404 eligibility.  Due to several errors that we describe 
below, we will vacate and remand in United States v. Harris 
and reverse and remand in United States v. Jackson.   
I 
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In 2006, Kevin Harris pleaded guilty to possession with 
the intent to distribute five grams or more of a mixture and 
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base 
(“crack”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii).  
As part of his plea agreement, Harris stipulated to the quantity 
he possessed—33.6 grams.  Harris later moved in 2019 for a 
reduction of his 210-month sentence pursuant to § 404.  See 
132 Stat. at 5222.  The U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania assumed that Harris was eligible 
under § 404 but denied relief, stating that “neither the statutory 
penalties nor the advisory guidelines range would be affected 
if [he] were sentenced today given the stipulated drug 
quantity.”  Harris App. 1–2.1  Harris timely appealed, claiming 
that this inaccurate statement tainted the Court’s decision. 
Anthony Jackson was convicted in 2004 of violating the 
same statute, § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii).  His indictment 
charged him with possession with the intent to distribute crack 
“in excess of five (5) grams, that is approximately forty-eight 
(48) grams.”  Jackson App. 46–47.  The jury convicted Jackson 
of possessing five grams or more, without any specific finding 
that he possessed forty-eight grams.  In 2019, Jackson moved 
under § 404 for a reduction of his 300-month sentence.  See 
132 Stat. at 5222.  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania denied relief, determining that he was 
ineligible.  Jackson filed a timely appeal. 
II 
 
1 Because we are reviewing two separate cases, the relevant 
petitioner’s name precedes each brief or record citation.   
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Several years after Harris and Jackson were convicted 
and sentenced, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.2  Section two 
amended their statute of conviction, § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), by 
increasing the quantity threshold from five to twenty-eight 
grams of crack.3  See 124 Stat. at 2372.  The Fair Sentencing 
Act, however, was not retroactive, see Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 264, 
so neither Harris nor Jackson was able to benefit from its 
passage.   
Enactment of the First Step Act in 2018 held the 
potential to remedy Harris’s and Jackson’s ineligibility.  It 
provides that “[a] court that imposed a sentence for a covered 
offense may, on motion of the defendant . . . impose a reduced 
sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was 
 
2 The Fair Sentencing Act was designed to “restore fairness to 
Federal cocaine sentencing.”  See 124 Stat. at 2372.  It aimed 
to achieve this goal by reducing the sentencing disparities 
between possessors of crack, who are predominately black or 
Latino, and possessors of powder cocaine, who are more often 
white.  See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268–69 
(2012); United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 
2011); Erik Eckholm, Congress Moves to Narrow Cocaine 
Sentencing Disparities, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at A16. 
3 Section two amended § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) so that the penalties 
previously triggered by possession of five grams or more of 
crack now require possession of twenty-eight grams or more.  
See 124 Stat. at 2372.  Similarly, section two increased the 
quantity threshold in § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) from fifty to 280 
grams of crack.  See id.   
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committed.”  § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222.  Section 404 permits 
the retroactive application of the penalty modification enacted 
in the Fair Sentencing Act, but its effect applies only to 
“covered offenses.”  Id.  So our initial inquiry concerns 
eligibility—whether a defendant has committed a “covered 
offense.”  Id.  Yet even if a defendant is eligible for relief 
because he committed a “covered offense,” that in itself “does 
not mean he is entitled to it.”  United States v. Beamus, 943 
F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 2019).  A district court may reduce a 
sentence but is not required to do so.  See § 404, 132 Stat. at 
5222 (statutory text makes § 404 discretionary); United States 
v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2019) (same). 
III 
The District Courts had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court exercises jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
As to the proper interpretation of a statute, our review is 
plenary.  See United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162 (3d 
Cir. 2020).  If a defendant is eligible for a reduced sentence 
under § 404, a district court’s denial of relief is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion.  A district court abuses its discretion by 
making an error of law or by relying on a clearly erroneous 
factual conclusion.  See United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 
217 (3d Cir. 2008). 
IV 
We begin, as we must, with the plain text of § 404.  See 
Hodge, 948 F.3d at 162; United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 
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260, 264 (3d Cir. 2007).  “[C]ourts must presume that a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute 
what it says there.”  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253–54 (1992).  If the statutory language is clear, then the 
text of the statute is the end of the matter.  See United States v. 
Jones, 471 F.3d 478, 480 (3d Cir. 2006).  But when a statute 
includes language reasonably susceptible to different 
interpretations, a court may attempt to discern Congress’s 
intent by employing canons of statutory construction.  See 
Introcaso, 506 F.3d at 264–65; Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 
259, 264 (3d Cir. 2005).   
Section 404 reads, 
(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE.—
In this section, the term “covered offense” means 
a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the 
statutory penalties for which were modified by 
section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
(Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372), that was 
committed before August 3, 2010. 
(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY 
SENTENCED.—A court that imposed a 
sentence for a covered offense may, on motion 
of the defendant, the Director of the Bureau of 
Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the 
court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 
and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public 
Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372) were in effect at 
the time the covered offense was committed. 
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(c) LIMITATIONS.—No court shall entertain a 
motion made under this section to reduce a 
sentence if the sentence was previously imposed 
or previously reduced in accordance with the 
amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 
124 Stat. 2372) or if a previous motion made 
under this section to reduce the sentence was, 
after the date of enactment of this Act, denied 
after a complete review of the motion on the 
merits. Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant 
to this section. 
132 Stat. at 5222.  As relevant to this dispute, a “covered 
offense” is “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the 
statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . that was committed 
before August 3, 2010.”  Id. (emphasis added).4     
The government contends that what matters for a 
“covered offense” is the defendant’s actual conduct (i.e., the 
drug quantity a defendant possessed), not limited to the charge 
in the indictment or the statute of conviction.5  This conduct-
 
4 The Fifth Circuit has referred to the italicized portion as the 
“penalties clause.”  See Jackson, 945 F.3d at 320.  We adopt 
this sensible convention. 
5 Under this conduct-based approach, § 404 eligibility turns on 
whether a defendant possessed more than the Fair Sentencing 
Act’s applicable threshold.  For instance, a defendant 
convicted of possessing five grams or more of crack, but who 
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based interpretation is reasonable if (1) the penalties clause 
modifies the word “violation” instead of “Federal criminal 
statute” and (2) “violation” refers to the underlying drug 
quantity, not the offense of conviction as defined by statute.  
See Jackson, 945 F.3d at 320; United States v. Wirsing, 943 
F.3d 175, 185–86 (4th Cir. 2019).  Conversely, Harris and 
Jackson argue that the term “covered offense” turns on a 
defendant’s statute of conviction.6  This approach results if the 
penalties clause modifies “Federal criminal statute” rather than 
“violation.” 
V 
Although § 404(a) is reasonably susceptible to these 
different interpretations, textual indicia lead us to concur with 
other courts of appeals that have already resolved this issue: 
Congress intended eligibility to turn on a defendant’s statute of 
 
had thirty grams, would be ineligible for relief because the 
amount possessed exceeds the Fair Sentencing Act’s quantity 
threshold of twenty-eight grams.  See § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372.  
Drug quantity is key to the conduct-based approach: it does not 
matter that the defendant was adjudged guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of possessing only five grams or more. 
6 Based on the statute of conviction approach, the statutory 
elements of the crime determine § 404 eligibility; a court need 
not look to the amount of drugs a defendant possessed.  As a 
result, a pre-Fair Sentencing Act defendant convicted of 
possession with the intent to distribute five grams or more of 
crack would fall below the Fair Sentencing Act’s raised 
threshold of twenty-eight grams, even if he possessed thirty, 
fifty, or seventy grams. 
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conviction rather than his conduct.  See United States v. Smith, 
954 F.3d 446, 448–49 (1st Cir. 2020); United States v. 
Johnson, 961 F.3d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. 
Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 185–86 (4th Cir. 2019); United States 
v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, — 
U.S. —, 2020 WL 1906710 (2020); United States v. Boulding, 
960 F.3d 774, 775 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Shaw, 957 
F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. McDonald, 944 
F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, — F.3d 
—, 2020 WL 3248113, at *7 (11th Cir. 2020). 
First, “[a] general rule of statutory interpretation is that 
modifiers attach to the closest noun; courts should not interpret 
statutes in such a way as to ‘divorce a noun from the modifier 
next to it without some extraordinary reason.’”7  Wirsing, 943 
F.3d at 185 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 56 
(2006)).  “Federal criminal statute” immediately precedes the 
penalties clause.  Thus, it is more natural to attach the penalties 
clause to “Federal criminal statute” instead of “violation.”  See 
Jackson, 945 F.3d at 320; Wirsing, 943 F.3d at 185. 
Second, according to the “anti-surplusage” canon, “[i]t 
is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word 
of a statute.  See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) 
(quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 
(1955)).   
[B]ecause sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing 
Act affected only violations of “Federal criminal 
 
7 This principle of interpretation is sometimes referred to as the 
“last antecedent rule” or the “nearest reasonable referent rule.” 
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statute[s],” it is hard to see what purpose the 
phrase “Federal criminal statute” could serve, or 
why Congress would have placed it where it 
did, except to be the antecedent of the limiting 
clause.  In other words, if [“violation” or] 
“violation of a Federal criminal statute” were the 
antecedent of the limiting clause, then the 
meaning of Section 404(a) would be the same as 
if it read: 
[T]he term “covered offense” 
means a violation of a Federal 
criminal statute, the statutory 
penalties for which were modified 
by section 2 or 3 of the Fair 
Sentencing Act . . . , that was 
committed before August 3, 2010. 
Reading [“violation” or] “violation of a Federal 
criminal statute” as the antecedent would thus 
attribute no meaning to Congress’s decision to 
include the words “of a Federal criminal statute” 
in the definition of “covered offense.” 
Johnson, 961 F.3d at 189.  The adjective “statutory” before the 
noun “penalties” would also become superfluous.  See Rose, 
379 F. Supp. 3d at 228.  The anti-surplusage canon sensibly 
instructs us to avoid this reading if we can.  
Third, the use of the past tense in “were modified” 
confirms that the penalties clause was intended to modify 
“Federal criminal statute.”  See Jackson, 945 F.3d at 320.  “The 
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Fair Sentencing Act [was not] retroactive when first passed, so 
it [could not modify] any penalties imposed for violations 
‘committed before August 3, 2010.’ Instead, the only ‘statutory 
penalties’ that the Fair Sentencing Act could have modified 
were the crack-cocaine penalties provided in the Controlled 
Substances Act itself.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
Fourth, Congress’s intent becomes even more clear 
when we consider which statutes’ penalty provisions “were 
modified by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act” and 
the language and structure of those statutes.  The Fair 
Sentencing Act modified not only the statutory penalties for 
§ 841 but also two other “Federal criminal statute[s],” each of 
which makes a distinction between the act violating the statute 
and the statutory penalties for that violation.  In the case of 
§ 841, subsection (a), entitled “Unlawful acts,” defines a 
violation of this statute to include “possess[ion] with intent to 
. . . distribute . . . a controlled substance,” while subsection 
(b)(1), entitled “Penalties,” sets out the statutory penalties for 
“any person who violates subsection (a).”  21 U.S.C. § 841(a), 
(b)(1) (emphasis added).  See also id. § 960(a) (describing the 
“Unlawful act[ ]” of “import[ing] or export[ing]” a controlled 
substance in subsection (a) and the “Penalties” in subsection 
(b)); id. § 844(a) (describing separately the “Unlawful act[ ]” 
of simple possession of a controlled substance and the 
“penalties” for “[a]ny person who violates this subsection”). 
Fifth, even if the legislative intent was for the penalties 
clause to modify “violation,” “a violation of a Federal criminal 
statute” most likely refers to the offense of conviction as 
defined by statute.  See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1624 
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(2016) (“The substantive elements primarily define[ ] the 
behavior that the statute calls a violation of federal law.”) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
And sixth, the government’s interpretation of § 404(a) 
is contrary to the clear weight of persuasive authority: no other 
court of appeals has adopted a quantity-based approach to 
§ 404 eligibility.  See Smith, 954 F.3d at 449 (adopting statute 
of conviction approach); Johnson, 961 F.3d at 183 (same); 
Wirsing, 943 F.3d at 185–86 (same); Jackson, 945 F.3d at 321 
(same); Boulding, 960 F.3d at 775 (same); Shaw, 957 F.3d at 
735 (same); McDonald, 944 F.3d at 772 (same); Jones, — F.3d 
—, 2020 WL 3248113, at *7 (same); see also Wagner v. 
Pennwest Farm Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909, 912 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(requiring a compelling basis to effect a circuit split). 
VI 
The government offers various counterarguments, none 
of which we consider persuasive.   
A 
One argument is that by interpreting § 404 to focus on 
a defendant’s statute of conviction, certain pre-Fair Sentencing 
Act defendants will receive a windfall.  A pre-Fair Sentencing 
Act defendant convicted of possession with the intent to 
distribute five grams or more of crack, but who possessed thirty 
grams, for example, could use the statute of conviction 
approach to fall below the Fair Sentencing Act’s elevated 
threshold of twenty-eight grams.  Such a defendant would be 
 14 
 
eligible for a discretionary reduction of sentence under § 404.  
In contrast, a post-Fair Sentencing Act defendant convicted of 
possession with the intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or 
more of crack, who possessed thirty grams, would not be 
eligible for a reduction of sentence.  The government believes 
that this outcome is inconsistent with the purpose of the First 
Step Act: to treat like offenders8 similarly by reducing the 
disparities between those sentenced pre- and post-Fair 
Sentencing Act.9 
 
8 The government wants pre- and post-Fair Sentencing Act 
defendants who possessed the same drug quantity to be treated 
alike.  But post-Fair Sentencing Act defendants have already 
benefited from changes to 21 U.S.C. § 841 and the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.  The contexts facing pre- and post-Fair 
Sentencing Act defendants are simply not analogous. 
9 See The First Step Act of 2018 (S.3649) – as introduced, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (describing a 
bill with the same text as the version of § 404 ultimately 
enacted that “allows prisoners sentenced before the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the 100-to-1 disparity in 
sentencing between crack and powder cocaine to petition the 
court for an individualized review of their case” and “bring[s] 
sentences imposed prior to 2010 in line with sentences imposed 
after the Fair Sentencing Act was passed”); 164 CONG. REC. 
S7021-22 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2018) (statement of Sen. Durbin) 
(depicting the same bill as an opportunity “to give a chance to 
thousands of people who are still serving sentences for 
nonviolent offenses involving crack cocaine under the old 100-
to-1 rul[e] to petition individually” for a reduction of sentence). 
 15 
 
Yet this concern over a possible windfall ignores the 
discretionary nature of § 404.  While a defendant may be 
eligible for a reduction of sentence, district courts are under no 
obligation to provide relief.  See § 404(b), (c), 132 Stat. at 5222.  
We are confident that district court judges will exercise their 
sound discretion in a way that avoids precipitating unfair 
disparities.  Indeed, we expect that a district court, in exercising 
its discretion, will consider the actual quantity of drugs a 
defendant possessed.   
We are also not persuaded that the statute of conviction 
approach runs counter to Congress’s intent.  It seems 
incongruent with the historical context of the First Step Act for 
Congress to have intended § 404 to apply only to the select pre-
Fair Sentencing Act defendants whose quantities fell between 
the old and new threshold amounts—from five to twenty-eight 
grams for § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and fifty to 280 grams for 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).  Congress passed “the First Step Act at a 
time when some, but not all, pre-Fair Sentencing Act inmates 
had [already] received relief by reference to their offense 
conduct through application of the post-Fair Sentencing Act” 
amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  Wirsing, 943 
F.3d at 186; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
2011 Supp. to App. C, Amendments 750, 759 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2011).  Since the First Step Act would 
have a minimal impact on inmates who had previously 
benefited via the Guidelines, Congress’s intent must have been 
to afford relief “to [other] pre-Fair Sentencing Act offenders, 
including those who were heretofore ineligible.”  Wirsing, 943 
F.3d at 186.  This suggests that Congress wanted the First Step 
Act to have a broad effect.  Because a conduct-based 
interpretation of § 404 would sharply limit eligibility, the 
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statute of conviction approach appears more in line with 
Congress’s purpose.10 
Moreover, a conduct-based interpretation of § 404 
presents its own policy concerns.  If § 404 eligibility is based 
on drug quantity, a court would have to speculate as to how a 
charge, plea, and sentencing would have looked had the Fair 
Sentencing Act been in effect.  See United States v. Pierre, 372 
F. Supp. 3d 17, 22 (D.R.I. 2019).  Such an analysis is 
problematic because it cannot account for the discretionary 
authority of either a prosecutor or a court.  Plea negotiations 
and colloquies are conducted against the backdrop of the 
statutory minimum and range.  So it is questionable, for 
example, whether a well-counseled defendant caught with 28.5 
grams of crack would have reached a plea deal of twenty-eight 
grams or more, thereby triggering the higher mandatory 
minimum by a mere 0.5 grams.  The realities of plea bargaining 
make it likely—indeed probable—that the parties would have 
stipulated to a lower quantity. 
We do not think that Congress meant to adopt a 
quantity-based approach to § 404 eligibility.  Beyond a few 
specific limitations found within the First Step Act,11 we see 
“no indication that Congress intended a complicated and 
 
10 Of course, if Congress intended that § 404 apply only to a 
select few, it can always enact legislation in furtherance of that 
end. 
11 See, e.g., § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222 (“No court shall 
entertain a motion made under this section . . . if a previous 
motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was . . . 
denied after a complete review.”). 
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eligibility-limiting determination at the ‘covered offense’ stage 
of the analysis.”  Wirsing, 943 F.3d at 186 (citing § 404(a), 132 
Stat. at 5222).  This purposivist argument simply cannot 
support the weight the government attempts to give it. 
B 
Other counterarguments are also unpersuasive.  For 
instance, the government asserts that the penalties clause 
modifies “violation” because the Fair Sentencing Act did not 
alter any statutory penalties: it only amended the quantity 
thresholds.12  Yet Congress explicitly defined those threshold 
changes as alterations to the statutory penalties: “the statutory 
penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . .”  § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222 
(emphasis added); see also Shaw, 957 F.3d at 739 (section two 
“did not modify the penalties on an individual basis.  Instead, 
it broadly modified penalties for entire categories of offenses 
that include fixed aggravating elements, such as the weight of 
the drug.”).  By enacting the Fair Sentencing Act, Congress 
altered the statutory penalties in § 841(b)(1).  Consequently, 
 
12 The government denies that the change in quantity, from 
“five grams or more” to “twenty-eight grams or more,” reflects 
any change in the statutory penalties applicable to Harris and 
Jackson.  After all, the statute’s mandatory minimum and 
maximum penalties remained the same: five years and forty 
years.  The increased threshold quantity—from five to twenty-
eight grams—merely reflects the point at which the minimum 
and maximum penalties apply. 
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we accord little weight to the fact that the changes solely 
impacted the quantity thresholds. 
We also discount the government’s redundancy 
argument.13  Two courts of appeals have already concluded 
that the recurrence of “statute” and “statutory” is not 
superfluous.  The Fourth Circuit determined that “[t]he First 
Step Act specifies that it is ‘statutory penalties’ that are at issue 
to avoid any ambiguity that might arise in the sentencing 
context between penalties specified by statute or by the 
Guidelines.”  Wirsing, 943 F.3d at 186.  The Fifth Circuit 
agreed, concluding that the reiteration made it “doubly clear 
that Congress intended to refer only to the statute under which 
the defendant was convicted.”  Jackson, 945 F.3d at 320.  We 
find those courts’ line of reasoning—distinguishing between 
statutory and Guidelines penalties—persuasive. 
Lastly, the government maintains that a conduct-based 
interpretation of § 404 is more fitting because of Congress’s 
use of the term “violation” rather than “conviction.”  
“Violation” can refer to conduct, particularly where there are 
civil consequences for unlawful actions.  See, e.g., Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488–90 (1985) 
(mentioning civil penalties for RICO violations absent a 
criminal conviction).  The First Step Act, however, applies 
only to those who have been convicted.  Within this context, 
 
13 The government avers that this redundancy disappears only 
if the whole phrase—“a violation of a Federal criminal 
statute”—is modified.  But this position does not help the 
government.  See supra Part V.  
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the “violation” versus “conviction” distinction loses most of its 
significance. 
To summarize, § 404 eligibility turns on a defendant’s 
statute of conviction, not on his possession of a certain quantity 
of drugs.  The last antecedent rule and other textual indicia of 
congressional intent support this conclusion, and the 
government’s various counterarguments are unavailing. 
VII 
Although Harris and Jackson each possessed more than 
twenty-eight grams of crack, Harris pleaded guilty to and 
Jackson was convicted of possession of five grams or more 
under § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii).  We determine if a defendant 
is § 404 eligible by looking to his statute of conviction.  Here, 
five grams or more is less than the current threshold of twenty-
eight grams.  See § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (modifying the statutory 
penalties in § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)).  Thus, Harris and Jackson can 
seek discretionary reductions of their sentences.   
Unlike the ruling in Jackson, the District Court in 
Harris assumed § 404 eligibility.  But the Court declined to 
exercise its discretion to reduce Harris’s sentence.  The Judge 
stated,  
this Court declines to exercise its discretion . . . 
[because] neither the statutory penalties nor the 
advisory guidelines range would be affected if 
Defendant were sentenced today given the 
stipulated drug quantity and the additional 
information provided by the defense regarding 
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his post-sentencing activities is not sufficient to 
persuade the Court that a sentence reduction is 
appropriate. 
Harris App. 1–2 (emphasis added).  Harris was sentenced as a 
career offender, and as a result, the stipulated drug quantity 
does not establish the advisory guidelines range; rather, it is the 
post-Fair Sentencing Act statutory maximum that fixes the 
offense level that would be ascribed to Harris today.  See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(b) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).  The Court’s reasoning was 
deficient in this respect, possibly tainting its exercise of 
discretion.  Out of an abundance of caution, we will ask the 
District Court to consider the reduction of sentence issue anew. 
VIII 
 Section 404(a) eligibility turns on a defendant’s statute 
of conviction rather than his actual conduct, meaning both 
Harris and Jackson are eligible for a reduction of sentence.  
Since the District Court in Jackson erroneously denied 
eligibility, we will reverse and remand for further proceedings.  
The District Court in Harris assumed § 404 eligibility, but 
because its decision to deny relief may have relied on faulty 
reasoning, we will vacate and remand for that Court to exercise 
its discretion in light of this opinion.  
 1 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.   
 The Majority concludes that Kevin Harris and Anthony 
Jackson are eligible for relief under § 404 of the First Step Act 
because they committed “covered offenses” under the statute. 
My disagreement with that premise requires this respectful 
dissent. 
I 
 This appeal presents a difficult question of statutory 
interpretation: Does the penalties clause modify “Federal 
criminal statute” as Appellants Harris and Jackson argue, or 
does it modify “violation” as the Government suggests? As my 
colleagues rightly note, § 404(a) is susceptible to different 
interpretations. The weight of authority strongly favors the 
Majority since the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have all 
adopted its position. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 
446, 448–49 (1st Cir. 2020); United States v. Johnson, 961 
F.3d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Wirsing, 943 
F.3d 175, 185–86 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jackson, 
945 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 
2020 WL 1906710 (2020); United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 
774, 781 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Shaw, 957 F.3d 734, 
735 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 
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772 (8th Cir. 2019).1 Yet several district courts have held that 
the Government has the better of the argument. See, e.g., 
United States v. Blocker, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (N.D. Fla. 
2019); United States v. Willis, 417 F. Supp. 3d 569 (E.D. Pa. 
2019). In my view, the district court opinions are more 
persuasive than those of our sister circuits. 
II 
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the drug 
weights of crack cocaine required to trigger certain mandatory 
statutory penalties. In particular, “[t]he Act increased the drug 
amounts triggering mandatory minimums for crack trafficking 
offenses from 5 grams to 28 grams in respect to the 5-year 
minimum and from 50 grams to 280 grams in respect to the 10-
year minimum (while leaving powder at 500 grams and 5,000 
grams respectively).” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 
269 (2012). But Congress did not make this change retroactive, 
so offenders responsible for 5 to 28 grams or 50 to 280 grams 
of crack before the Fair Sentencing Act faced harsher penalties 
 
1 I note, however, that the government conceded 
eligibility in Wirsing and the court only briefly explained its 
decision to adopt the statute of conviction theory. 943 F.3d at 
181–82, 185–86. Likewise, the defendant’s offense in 
McDonald involved 57 grams of crack, making him eligible 
for a reduced sentence under either theory. 944 F.3d at 771–
72. So the government did not argue that the defendant did not 
commit a “covered offense.” Id. at 772. And in Smith, the First 
Circuit acknowledged the holdings in Wirsing, McDonald, and 
Jackson and “assume[d] that this case law is correct” because 
the government provided “no hint of an argument . . . that [it] 
should hold otherwise.” 954 F.3d at 448–49. 
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than offenders who possessed the same amount of crack after 
its enactment. 
 Congress addressed this disparity by passing the First 
Step Act of 2018. As the Majority explains, § 404 of the First 
Step Act gives offenders who committed a “covered offense” 
the chance to seek a reduced sentence.  
Central to the dispute in these appeals is whether district 
courts must consider an offender’s statute of conviction or his 
actual conduct when determining whether he committed a 
“covered offense.” The Majority concludes the statute of 
conviction controls. But the most natural reading of § 404 is 
that an offender’s actual conduct dictates eligibility.  
III 
A 
 “A court’s primary purpose in statutory interpretation is 
to discern legislative intent.” Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 
277 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see United States v. 
Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 744 (3d Cir. 1994). We “presume that 
Congress expressed its legislative intent through the ordinary 
meaning of the words it chose to use.” Knox, 32 F.3d at 744 
(citations omitted). “Thus, it is axiomatic that when the 
statutory language is clear, the words must be interpreted in 
accordance with their ordinary meaning.” Id.; see United States 
v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294–95 (3d Cir. 2008) (using legal and 
general dictionaries to discern the ordinary meaning of words). 
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The text of the First Step Act suggests an offender’s actual drug 
quantity determines eligibility. 
First, a “violation” is defined as “the act of violating,” 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2005), or 
“[t]he act of breaking or dishonoring the law,” Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). And “act” in this 
context refers to the conduct underlying an offender’s arrest 
and conviction, not the words of the indictment or statute. 
Congress could have defined “covered offense” to refer to the 
statute of conviction. Instead, Congress defined “covered 
offense” as a “violation,” which is an “act.” See Sedima 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) 
(“violation” does not imply a criminal conviction and “refers 
only to a failure to adhere to legal requirements”). By defining 
“covered offense” as a “violation,” Congress intended courts 
to consider whether the Fair Sentencing Act changed the 
penalties for the offender’s actual conduct—here, Harris and 
Jackson’s possession with the intent to distribute more than 28 
grams of crack. 
Second, the Majority says Congress’s use of “violation” 
reveals little because the First Step Act applies only to those 
previously convicted. Maj. Op. 19. But Congress’s use of “as 
if” and “committed” in § 404(b) also suggests courts must look 
to an offender’s actual conduct to determine eligibility. To 
“commit” is “to carry into action deliberately,” Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2005), or “[t]o 
perpetrate (a crime),” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
And “perpetrate” means “to bring about or carry out,” 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2005), or 
“[t]o commit or carry out (an act, esp. a crime).” Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Harris and Jackson “committed” 
their crimes when they possessed with the intent to distribute 
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more than 28 grams of crack. So if a district court is to consider 
imposing a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act was 
in effect at that time, it must consider the offender’s conduct to 
determine which subsection of 21 U.S.C. § 841 the 
Government would have charged. 
Take Harris’s case as an example. A court considering 
a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act was in effect 
when he committed his offense must engage in a simple three-
step analysis. First, it would consider the amount of crack 
cocaine attributable to him—33.6 grams. Second, it would 
determine the relevant threshold amount—28 grams or more. 
And third, it would consider the statutory penalty associated 
with that threshold amount—5 to 40 years’ imprisonment. That 
statutory penalty range is the same as for Harris’s 2007 
conviction. So he is not eligible for a reduction under § 404. 
To consider only the charged conduct in Harris’s case—“five 
grams or more”—would conflict with the plain meaning of the 
statutory text and ignore the reality of Harris’s offense.  
The Majority contends that considering actual conduct 
requires the “problematic” speculation of how the Government 
would have prosecuted a violation post-Fair Sentencing Act. 
Maj. Op. 16. That may be true in some cases, and any lack of 
uncertainty in that regard should entitle the petitioner to a fresh 
review by the trial judge. But in many other cases—like the 
two before us here—the district courts won’t have much 
speculating to do. Here, Harris admitted to possessing 33.6 
grams and the uncontroverted record showed that Jackson 
possessed 48 grams. Because Harris and Jackson both 
possessed more than 28 grams but less than 280 grams, they 
were chargeable with “28 grams or more.” 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey v. United 
States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) also suggests we should consider 
an offender’s actual conduct. There, the Court held that the Fair 
Sentencing Act’s “new, more lenient mandatory minimum 
provisions do apply to [] pre-Act offenders” convicted, but not 
yet sentenced, when the Act took effect. Id. at 264. In so 
concluding, the Court considered the offender’s actual 
conduct, saying: 
With this background in mind, we turn to the 
relevant facts of the cases before us. Corey Hill, 
one of the petitioners, unlawfully sold 53 grams 
of crack in March 2007, before the Fair 
Sentencing Act became law. . . . Under the 1986 
Drug Act, an offender who sold 53 grams of 
crack was subject to a 10-year mandatory 
minimum. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006 
ed.). Hill was not sentenced, however, until 
December 2010, after the Fair Sentencing Act 
became law and after the new Guidelines 
amendments had become effective. . . . Under 
the Fair Sentencing Act, an offender who sold 53 
grams of crack was subject to a 5-year, not a 10-
year, minimum. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006 ed., 
Supp. IV). 
Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Significantly, the Court did not 
say “an offender convicted of selling fifty grams or more was 
subject to a 5-year, not a 10-year, minimum.” Rather, the Court 
used the offender’s actual conduct when discussing whether 
the penalty for that conduct had changed. We should do the 
same here. 
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Finally, the meaning of “statutory penalty” and the 
evolution of the Fair Sentencing Act also support interpreting 
“covered offense” to refer to an offender’s actual conduct. A 
“statutory penalty” is (unsurprisingly) “[a] penalty imposed for 
a statutory violation.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
The Majority characterizes the Fair Sentencing Act’s quantity 
threshold amendments as amendments to statutory penalties. 
Maj. Op. 17–18. I cannot square that characterization with the 
statutory text or a commonsense definition of “statutory 
penalty.” 
Congress did not amend the penalties for crack cocaine 
offenses in the Fair Sentencing Act; it retained the previous 
mandatory penalty ranges while amending the threshold drug 
amounts that trigger those penalties. It follows that “the 
statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010” must modify “violation” 
or “violation of a Federal criminal statute” because the Fair 
Sentencing Act modified the quantities that trigger certain 
penalties, not the penalties themselves. In other words, the Fair 
Sentencing Act changed the penalties for certain “violations,” 
or acts. It did not change the penalties for the “Federal criminal 
statute”—they remained the same. 
Taken together, these textual cues support an 
interpretation based on an offender’s actual conduct rather than 
the statute of conviction. 
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B 
The Majority offers three principal reasons in support 
of its interpretation, but I find each one wanting. 
First, the Majority relies on the “last antecedent rule” to 
support its interpretation that “the statutory penalties for which 
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010” modifies only “Federal criminal statute.” Maj. Op. 10. 
That rule instructs that modifiers usually attach to the closest 
noun. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 56 (2006). 
Generally, courts should not interpret statutes to “divorce a 
noun from the modifier next to it without some extraordinary 
reason.” Id.  
I have no quarrel with this rule in general, but I disagree 
with its application here. The Majority concludes that “Federal 
criminal statute” is the closest noun to the modifier. But it’s 
more reasonable to read the modifier as applying to “violation 
of a Federal criminal statute” because “that clause hangs 
together as a unified whole, referring to a single thing.” Cyan, 
Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emp. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1077 
(2018). That’s why the Supreme Court declined to apply the 
last antecedent rule in Cyan “when the modifier directly 
follows a concise and ‘integrated’ clause.” Id. (citation 
omitted).  
Here, “violation of a Federal criminal statute” is a 
“concise and integrated clause.” In this statutory scheme, it 
would be anomalous to separate “violation” from “Federal 
criminal statute” in § 404(a) because penalties attach to 
violations and the Fair Sentencing Act modified conduct 
thresholds, not the actual penalties.  
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Second, my colleagues emphasize Congress’s use of the 
past tense (“were modified”) in the penalties clause. Maj. Op. 
12. They conclude that the penalties clause cannot apply to 
violations because the non-retroactive Fair Sentencing Act 
could not have “modified” the penalty imposed for a 
“violation” “committed before August 3, 2010.” Id. Although 
this reading of the statute is plausible, the better reading 
suggests that “were modified” refers to the statutory penalties 
associated with specific violations that the Fair Sentencing Act 
modified ten years ago. 
Finally, the Majority reasons that considering actual 
drug quantities renders § 404’s reference to “statute” and 
“statutory penalties” superfluous. Maj. Op. 11–12. But 
Congress’s use of “statute” and “statutory penalties” makes 
perfect sense if we read “violation of a Federal criminal 
statute” as an integrated whole. Congress did not modify any 
penalties, just the drug weights triggering them. So as long as 
we interpret “statutory penalties for which” as referring to a 
“violation of a Federal criminal statute,” there is no superfluity.  
For these reasons, I disagree with the Majority’s 
conclusion that canons of interpretation suggest that § 404 
eligibility turns on an offender’s statute of conviction instead 
of his actual conduct.  
C 
When interpreting a statute we also consider “the design 
of the statute as a whole and its object and policy,” United 
States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1994), “and 
avoid constructions that produce ‘odd’ or ‘absurd results’ or 
that are ‘inconsistent with common sense.’ See Public Citizen 
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (internal 
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quotations omitted).” Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 The Majority’s interpretation of § 404 not only 
undermines the goals of the Fair Sentencing Act and the First 
Step Act, it also opens the door to absurd results. Congress 
enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to “restore fairness to Federal 
cocaine sentencing” by reducing sentencing disparities 
between crack and powder cocaine offenders. See 124 Stat. at 
2372. And in passing the First Step Act, Congress meant to 
extend the Fair Sentencing Act to crack offenders sentenced 
before the Fair Sentencing Act. See S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
115th Cong., The First Step Act of 2018 (S.3649), at 2 
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media
/doc/S.%203649%20First%20Step%20Act%20Summary%20
-%20As%20Introduced.pdf (remarking § 404 would “bring 
sentences imposed prior to 2010 in line with sentences imposed 
after the Fair Sentencing Act was passed”). The interpretation 
adopted by the Majority does the opposite. 
 Instead of avoiding sentence disparities and bringing 
pre-Fair Sentencing Act crack sentences in line with sentences 
imposed thereafter, the Majority’s interpretation will invite 
greater disparities and give some offenders a windfall. Take 
these cases. Today’s decision makes Harris eligible for a 
reduced sentence even though he admitted to possessing 33.6 
grams of crack cocaine, simply because he was convicted and 
sentenced before August 3, 2010. Jackson gets the same 
opportunity even though police found him asleep at the wheel 
in possession of 48 grams of crack. But a defendant convicted 
and sentenced in 2011 for possessing 29 grams of crack—less 
weight than both Harris and Jackson—would not be eligible 
for a reduced sentence. Congress could not have intended such 
disparate treatment. 
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 As that example reveals, the Majority’s interpretation 
will not “bring sentences imposed prior to 2010 in line with 
sentences imposed after the Fair Sentencing Act was passed.” 
Instead, it empowers sentencing judges to treat those convicted 
before 2010 more favorably than those convicted thereafter. 
The Majority emphasizes that relief under § 404 is 
discretionary. Maj. Op. 15. True enough, but the fact remains 
that district judges around the country—some, not all—will 
reduce sentences for pre-August 3, 2010 offenders, while 
offenders who committed the same or lesser offenses 
afterwards will have no such opportunity. In doing so, those 
courts will accomplish the opposite of what Congress intended 
in the First Step Act.  
The Supreme Court’s Dorsey opinion is instructive once 
again. In holding that the Fair Sentencing Act’s new threshold 
amounts applied to offenders not yet sentenced on August 3, 
2010, the Court explained that  
applying the 1986 Drug Act’s old mandatory 
minimums to the post-August 3 sentencing of 
pre-August 3 offenders would create disparities 
of a kind that Congress enacted the Sentencing 
Reform Act and the Fair Sentencing Act to 
prevent. Two individuals with the same number 
of prior offenses who each engaged in the same 
criminal conduct involving the same amount of 
crack and were sentenced at the same time would 
receive radically different sentences. 
567 U.S. at 276–77 (emphasis added). The problem identified 
by the Court in Dorsey applies here too.  
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The “actual conduct” approach serves the purpose of 
aligning pre-2010 sentences with post-2010 sentences without 
sweeping more broadly than Congress intended. Although that 
approach means Harris and Jackson are ineligible for a 
reduction because their sentences match post-2010 sentences 
for the same drug quantities, thousands of other offenders 
would be entitled to relief.2 For example, all offenders who 
 
2 Before the First Step Act’s enactment, the United 
States Sentencing Commission estimated that the Act would 
make 2,660 prisoners eligible for a sentence reduction. See 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sentence and Prison Impact 
Estimate Summary S. 756, The First Step Act of 2018 (Dec. 18, 
2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/prison-and-sentencing-impact-
assessments/December_2018_Impact_Analysis.pdf; see also 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sentence and Prison Impact 
Estimate Summary S. 1917, The Sentencing Reform and 
Corrections Act of 2017 (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/prison-and-sentencing-impact-
assessments/August_2018_Impact_Analysis_for_CBO.pdf 
(providing the same estimate under a different bill with 
identical language). 
 
But under the “statute of conviction” theory, this 
number will skyrocket. Every crack defendant sentenced 
before the Fair Sentencing Act took effect will be eligible for 
a reduction, at least in districts where indictments routinely 
track the statute. The number of eligible defendants would 
dwarf the Sentencing Commission’s estimate. See U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Drug Offenders in Federal Prison: Estimates of 
Characteristics Based on Linked Data (October 2015), 
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possessed 6 to 27 grams of crack in 2000 and were subject to a 
5-year mandatory minimum are now eligible for a sentence 
reduction because those weights do not trigger a mandatory 
minimum under the Fair Sentencing Act.  
 In sum, § 404 is far from clear. But when one considers 
the statute’s text, context, and its history, the balance tips in 
favor of evaluating actual conduct to determine eligibility for 
a sentence reduction. Indeed, this is the only approach that 
accomplishes Congress’s twin goals of offering a chance at a 
reduced sentence for certain crack offenders who violated the 
drug laws in ways ameliorated by the Fair Sentencing Act and 
reducing sentencing disparities. Because the violations 
committed by Harris and Jackson are not “covered offenses” 
under the statute, I respectfully dissent. 
 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dofp12.pdf (noting there 
were 26,409 total crack cocaine offenders in federal prison in 
2012). 
